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U.S. Conflict of Laws Involving
International Estates and Marital
Property: A Critical Analysis of Estate of
Charaniav. Shulman
Jeffrey Schoenblum*
ABSTRACT: A number of states, as well as foreign jurisdictions, impose a
community property regime. Under this regime, regardless of the title to
property, each spouse is deemed to own a fifty percent interest in assets. When
a spouse dies owningproperty in his own name, the tendency is to treat him
as the owner of the asset infullforpurposes of thepower to dispose of the asset
andfor transfertax purposes.However, if the property is community property,
then the decedent 's power to dispose of it, and theportion of the property subject
to taxation, is only fifty percent. In light of theforegoing, a criticalconflict of
laws question must be confronted: Which jurisdiction'slaws should determine
whether the property is community property ? In the United States, the conflict
of laws issue is not too problematic because all the states essentiallyfollow the
same choice of law principle in deciding which state's law is determinative.
However, when foreign jurisdictionsare involved, the question of which law
determines spousal property rights can become incredibly complicated. In large
part, this is becauseforeign jurisdictions may apply very difJerent conflict of
laws principles than those adhered to in the United States when it comes to
the question of marital property rights. Compounding the problem is the
dearth of case law addressingthe matter.A 2 o o decision by the First Circuit
Court ofAppeals, Estate of Charania v. Shulman, does address the matter.
However, it does so in an opinion that is noteworthy for its striking analytical
flaws. This Article delves into the opinion, which is starting to garner illdeserved precedential value. The Article reveals the opinion' deep flaws and
proposes a far more restrained and workable approach for mediating the
difJerent conflict of laws approaches that are often at play when an
internationalestate is at issue.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, people routinely move from one state to another
and also own property in more than one state. They marry and, while married,
acquire title to property in their individual names, or alternatively, in some
form of title by which his or her spouse also obtains an ownership interest.
Under the laws of some states, the spouse automatically acquires a 50%
interest simply on account of being married to the individual acquiring the
property.1 Even if title is taken exclusively in the individual's name, the
spouse's legal rights under the law are not impaired. These states maintain a
community-property system, as opposed to the vast majority of states that
maintain a separate-property system.
But suppose the couple moves from the community-property state to a
state that has a separate-property regime. Are the spouse's previously acquired
rights forfeited? Or have they been forever vested?2 Likewise, suppose the
property was originally acquired by one spouse individually in a separateproperty state that does not recognize community property. If the couple then
moves to a community-property state, does the spouse immediately acquire

1. These would be the community-property states: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE
DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 5 20 11.1 (ioth ed. 2017). "Alaska, South Dakota, and

Tennessee offer a community-property option." Id.
2.

For consideration of this topic, see

I JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND

MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING § 1O.2 1 [C]-[D] (2OO).
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rights in the property? Or does the original characterization of the property
as separately owned remain in force?3
The answers to these questions are important for probate and estate
administration, as well as federal estate tax law. In particular, upon the death
of an individual, a critical question needs to be answered: What assets
constitute the individual's estate both for non-tax and federal estate tax
purposes? More precisely, in terms of the topic this Article explores: What
portion of the assets titled in the name of the decedent actually belongs to the
surviving spouse on account of community-property laws? To the extent that
the surviving spouse is found to own a portion of such property, that
ownership will not only reduce what the devisees or heirs of the decedent
receive, but it will also reduce the amount includible in the decedent's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes, thereby reducing the decedent's federal
estate tax liability.
To determine whether the surviving spouse has an ownership interest in
a particular asset titled exclusively in the decedent's name, the law of some
jurisdiction will have to be consulted. But which one? For nearly 2oo years,
the prevailing doctrine in the United States has been "partial mutability."
Under this conflict-of-laws rule, the right of a spouse in a movable asset
acquired during marriage is determined by the law of the state in which the
spouses had their marital domicile at the time of the acquisition of the asset.4
Thus, if the spouses change their marital domicile during the marriage, it is
entirely possible that different movable assets will be governed by different
laws. This conflict-of-laws rule is widely known as "partial mutability" because
the law of the original marital domicile does not remain the governing law as
to assets acquired after a change in marital domicile has taken place.5 In other
words, there is "mutability." However, it is only "partial" because with respect
to rights acquired at a particular marital domicile, they are not mutable and
are not lost simply by moving to a new marital domicile that does not
6
recognize those spousal rights.

3.
Note that even if spouses are moving from one community-property jurisdiction to
another, those jurisdictions may have different community-property rules, so that it will still be
necessary to determine which jurisdiction's law is controlling in determining what rights the
spouse has. Id. § 1o.2 i[D].
4. See Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (i.s.) 569, 6o3-o8 (La. 1827). The holding was
endorsed by Joseph Story, who stated the rule as follows: "[Where there is no such express
nuptial contract, the law of the matrimonial domicil is to prevail, as to the antecedent property;
but the property acquired after the removal is to be governed by the law of the actual domicil."
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS,

SUCCESSIONS, ANDJUDGMENTS 284-85 ( 4 th ed. 1852 ); see HAROLD MARSH,JR., MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 1o8-o9 ( 952).

5. See, e.g., MARSH, supra note 4, at i o8 (explaining the shift in which law governs depending
on when and where assets are acquired); SCHOENBLUM, supra note 2, § 10.21 [C] (explaining how
different laws may govern different assets depending on time and place of acquisition).
6.

MARSH, supranote 4, at to8-to.
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Notice that the preceding choice-of-law rule does not apply to immovable
property. For this type of property, the rights of a spouse are determined by
the law of the situs jurisdiction rather than the marital domicile.7 As a result,
there is a "scission" in determining marital-property rights, which elevates the
significance of identifying property as movable or immovable. That task is
further complicated by the fact that different jurisdictions may characterize
assets differently. Thus, there is necessarily a preliminary question as to which
jurisdiction's law should be controlling on the characterization question.8
Up to this point, I have discussed cross-border marital-property rights and
succession within the United States. However, many foreign countries,
principally those adhering to the civil-law system, reject partial mutability and
impose a marital-property rights choice-of-law rule described as "strict
immutability."9 This approach looks to the law of the spouses' domicile at the
time of their marriage as the final and immutable determinant of the spouse's
marital-property rights, regardless of the marital domicile at the time of the
asset's acquisition.1o While the spouses are typically free to mutually alter the
governing law by contract, if they fail to do so, strict immutability controls.
Finally, in sharp contrast to partial mutability and strict immutability, a
third choice-of-law approach is enforced by a limited number of foreign
jurisdictions and is known as "total mutability."- Pursuant to this approach,
the marital-property rights of the spouses mutate as the spouses change their
marital domicile. In other words, the rights of the spouses are not finally
determined until divorce or the death of a spouse, either of which terminates
the marriage.12 Because this approach fosters an inherent instability in
property rights, total mutability has not been widely adopted.
Inasmuch as many foreign countries do not adhere to the partialmutability approach, but rather look to the original marital domicile under
the strict-immutability approach, there is a substantial likelihood that the
controlling law with respect to at least certain assets will be different,
7.

SCHOENBLUM, suprariote 2,

§

lo.21[C].

8.
Id. "Characterization" has been criticized as an escape device from rigid choice-of-law
rules. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics of the StandAlone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1134-35 (2010) (describing how courts used
characterization in suits to avoid otherwise strictly observed choice-of-law black-letter rules). But
see James Y. Stern, Property, Exclusivity, and Jurisdiction, 1oo VA. L. REV. 111, 161-63 (2014)
(endorsing the situs rule and arguing that the breadth with which the situs rule is applied to real
property tends to reduce characterization problems).
9.
SeeWalter Pinteris &Jens M. Scherpe, MatrimonialProperty, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. M- 7 , § 3 (b) ( 3 ) (Jfirgeri Basedow et al. eds., 2017).
10.

MARSH, supra note 4, at lo6-O8.

11.

Switzerland is a leading example of a foreign jurisdiction that applies total mutability.

See Philippe Puller & Azadeh Djalili, Acquiring Domicile in Switzerland: Consequences of the
MatrimonialProperty Regime, 17 TR. & TRUSTEES 323, 325-26 (2o 1). The principle is also known
as "conflit mobile." See generally FRANCOIS KNOEPFLER ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE SUISSE
115-18 (2004).
12.

MARSH, supra rote

4, at 104-06.
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depending on which approach is applied. In contrast, when only states of the
United States are involved, there is near uniformity on the application of the
partial-mutability approach.13
Surprisingly, in light of the number of people wit international ties, and
the contentious issues that one would expect to arise, there is a deart of
federal appellate court conflict-of-laws decisions involving international
marital-property rights.14 One might predict that any opinion that seeks to
analyze the relevant conflict-of-laws issues in dept is likely to carry great
weight and substantially influence oter courts. Especially since conflict-oflaws issues involving international aspects of marital property are hardly the
specialty of judges and attorneys witin the United States, there may be a
hesitancy and humility about criticizing any such appellate opinion. In fact,
there is one such opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, Estate of Charaniav. Shulman, decided in 2010.15 Called upon to
address a slew of international marital-property choice-of-law issues of
supreme importance, the court managed to resolve virtually every one of
them incorrectly. Neverteless, the opinion is increasingly cited as
6
autloritative.1
This Article intends to bring to light the many analytical flaws of Charania
in the hope, first, of discouraging uncritical reliance on the opinion by future
courts and commentators. Second, the Article's exposure of the numerous
and severe analytical flaws in the court's application of "foreign law" is
intended to serve as a cautionary lesson concerning the difficulties in getting
"foreign" law right, especially when that "law" includes the foreign
jurisdiction's whole law, that is including its conflict-of-laws rules as well.

13.
See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 2, § 1o.24 [A]; see also Friedrich K Jueriger, Marital Property
and the Conflict of Laws: A Tale of Two Countries, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1o61, 1071 (1981) (discussing
why the United States adopted the partial-mutability approach); Robert A. Leflar, Community
Property and Conflict ofLaws, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 229 (1933) ("The 'source doctrine' under the
law of any given state is equally applicable to property acquired with other property just brought
into the state, and to property acquired with other property which has been in the state all along.").
14.
There are numerous decisions and administrative rulings that involve income tax issues.
See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 699 (1984); Santiago v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 53 (1973),
affd, 51o F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Rev. Rul. 59-199, 1959-1 C.B. 182. Although
lingering in the background, there is little, if any, discussion of the varied conflict-of-laws
approaches to marital-property rights and which is controlling.
15.
Estate of Charania v. Shulman, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2oo). The First Circuit
affirmed with respect to the substantive issues, but reversed the Tax Court with respect to the
imposition of certain penalties. Id. at 77.
16.

For example, the opinion relied heavily on the English conflict-of-laws treatise, 2 DICEY

ET AL., THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (

4

th ed. 2oo6) [hereinafter DICEY 14TH EDITION]; see Estate of

Charania, 6o8 F. 3 d at 72 11.4, 73-75. The 15 th edition now cites the First Circuit decision in
support of the stance it takes that English law follows strict immutability. 2 DICEY ET AL., THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1482 11.131 (1

note 98 and accompanying text.

5

th ed. 2o

2) [hereinafter DICEY 15TH EDITION]; see also infra
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THE UNDERLYING FACTS OF CHARANIA

Noordin M. Charania and Roshankhanu Dhanani, both of Indian
descent, were born in Uganda at a time when it was a British protectorate and
administered as part of British East Africa. They married in 1967, just five
years after Uganda gained its independence.17 They had both been granted
United Kingdom citizenship.,S
In 1972, the infamous dictator Idi Amin "ordered the expulsion of [all]
Ugandans of Asian descent" and the expropriation of their property.1 9 Mr.
Charania and his wife fled to Belgium, as he had worked for a Belgian trading
company.20 The couple proceeded to settle in that country, having no
property of substantial value to their names when they arrived, with just a few
items of personal property. 21 Indisputably, it became their marital domicile as
well as the individual domicile for each of them, along with their children.22
The record does not reveal if Mr. Charania or his spouse had ever set foot in
their country of citizenship, the United Kingdom, but they do not appear ever
to have spent a sustained period of time there or had any other palpable ties
with the United Kingdom or any of its lawmaking subdivisions.23 There is also
no indication that the couple spent any time in the United States or had any
ties with it or any of its lawmaking subdivisions. 24
In August 1997, Mr. Charania made an investment in Citicorp, which
6
soon became Citigroup.25 The corporation is a domestic U.S. corporation.2
On account of appreciation and stock splits, Mr. Charania's investment
blossomed over time into a valuable asset of 250,000 shares.27 OnJanuary 31,
2oo2, Mr. Charania died.28 The 250,000 shares had a fair market value of
$1 1,790,000.29 At the time of his death, the shares were registered exclusively
in the decedent's name and were held by a bank in Hong Kong.3o Under §
2104(a) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), stock of a domestic
corporation owned by a nonresident, noncitizen of the United States, is

17.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F.3 d at 69; Uganda Independence Act, 1962, io& 11 Eliz. 2, ch. 57.

18.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 69.

19.

Id.

2o.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.

See id.

23.
See id. None of the available briefs, nor the court's opinion, mention arty presence, at
ary time, of either spouse in England or ary other part of the United Kingdom.
24.

See id.

25.
26.

Id.
Id.

27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.

30.

Estate of Charania v. Comm'r, 133 T.C. 122, 124 (2oo9) affd in part, rev'd in part,

603 F.3 d 67 (1st Cir. 2oo).
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deemed situated in the United States3s and, on that basis, is included in the
gross estate of such nonresident, not a citizen of the Unites States for purposes
of the calculation of federal estate tax liability.32 Precisely because the basis
for taxation of the shares of stock is their presumed situs in the United States,
the fact that the decedent may never have set foot in the United States proved
irrelevant. 33
Although the shares of Citigroup stock were registered exclusively in Mr.
Charania's name at the time of his death, his estate filed a return reporting
only one-half of the shares as being owned by him.34 In support of its position,
one might have expected the estate to emphasize that the partial-mutability
approach applies and that the shares were community property, having been
acquired while the couple were domiciled in Belgium, a community-property
jurisdiction. Belgium treats all property acquired during marriage as owned
one-half by each spouse, unless the spouses elect to opt out.35 There was no
evidence that Mr. Charania and Ms. Dhanani had any intent or made any
effort to opt out of the default Belgian community-property law.3 6 Pursuant to
the partial-mutability approach, the decedent's spouse had acquired a onehalf interest in the shares at the time of their acquisition.Thus, the decedent's
estate should be subject only to tax on the one-half of the shares that he
owned.37

In fact, attorneys for the estate did not contend that the partial-mutability
approach was determinative. Instead, they stipulated that the law of England
applied and that English law applies the total-mutability approach.3 They
then argued that, under the total-mutability approach, Belgian communityproperty law applied because the spouses had a Belgian marital domicile at
31.
I.R.C. § 2104(a) (2o12). If, indeed, a situs rulejustifies federal estate taxation of stock
of a nonresident, not a citizen of the United States, then might it be argued that the same situs
rule should be applied when determining marital property rights, even though stock is movable
property? This would unify the tax and marital-property rights treatment. On the other hand, it
would result in spouses having potentially different property rights, depending whether or not
marital property rights were being determined for purposes of the federal estate tax with respect
to the same asset. As previously discussed, when real property is involved, the situs law determines
marital-property rights rather than the law of the marital domicile for both tax and non-tax
matters. See supra text accompanying note 7.
32I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2 1o(a); Estate of Charania,6o8 F.3 d at 71. While a substantial credit
against estate tax was, and continues to be, afforded citizens and residents, see I.R.C. § 2oo(c),
the same is not true for noriresidents, not citizens of the United States, who are granted a
strikingly smaller credit. See I.R.C. § 2 1o2 (b) (1). Moreover, while the estate of a nonresident, not
a citizen of the United States may claim a marital deduction for property passing to a surviving
spouse who is a citizen, no such deduction is available if the surviving spouse, as in the case of Ms.
Dhanani, is not a citizen of the United States. See I.R.C. § 20 5 6 (d).
33.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 71.

34.

Id. at 70.

35.

Id. at 71-

36.

Id. at 75.

37.

Id. at 70.

38.

Id. at 71.

7
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Mr. Charania's death.39 The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") agreed that
English law controlled, but asserted that English law applies the strictThat approach, the IRS argued, required
immutability approach.4
application of the law of Uganda, the original marital domicile, rather than
the law of the ultimate marital domicile, Belgium.41 Since the parties
stipulated that Ugandan law was the same as English law, the IRS maintained
that England's separate-property law governed and that the decedent's
surviving spouse did not own any of the shares at his death.42 Accordingly, the
IRS argued, it was correct to include in the decedent's gross estate all of the
Citigroup shares.43
The First Circuit endorsed the stipulations of the parties without seriously
questioning them.44 The court decided that on the basis of a single decision
of the House of Lords from more than a century earlier, De Nicols v. Curlier,45
English law requires application of strict immutability. It also concluded that
it was compelled to strictly apply this authority, citing two federal diversity
cases requiring federal courts to abide by the holdings of the highest court of
the state in which the federal court sits.4 6 In holding for the government, the
First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court.47 The estate did not seek
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
When one steps back and considers the outcome in Charaniait seems
rather surprising, if not unjust. A man of Indian descent was exiled with his
spouse from Uganda, their birthplace and country where their marriage was
celebrated. They fled to Belgium with no assets. They remained in Belgium
for the rest of the man's life and, while there, acquired substantial assets,
notably Citigroup shares. There was only one connection with the United
Kingdom: citizenship acquired as a result of their exile from the former
British colony. Neither the decedent nor his spouse ever developed any
palpable connections specifically with England, a political subdivision of the
United Kingdom, nor with the United States. Nevertheless, the United States
was able to tax the estate on the basis of English law!

39.

Id. at 71-72.

40.

Id. at

41.

Id.

7

2.

See id. at 70, 72.
43.
Id. at 7 6.
44. See, e.g.,
id. at 72 (accepting, without further inquiry, the parties' stipulation that
Uganda's marital-property regime at the time of marriage was equivalent to that of England's
marital-property regime); see also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
42.

45.

De Nicols v.Curlier [ 19oo] A.C. 21 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).

46.
Estate of Charania, 6o8 F.3 d at 74; see also infra text accompanying notes 96-1o2
(discussing the doctrine of renvoi).
47.
Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 77. Certain other aspects of the 2oo9 Tax Court opinion,
Estate of Charaniav. Commr ,involving issues other than the conflict of laws and marital property,
were reversed by the First Circuit. Id. at 76-77.
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THE TROUBLING FLAWS IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S
CONFLICT-OF-LAws ANALYSIS

There are troubling flaws in the First Circuit's conflict-of-laws analysis in
Charania. These flaws, arguably begin with the second footnote of the
opinion, in which the court stated that it "express[ed] no opinion on the
appropriateness of this [principle]. Rather, we work within the framework to
which the parties have agreed."4 The "principle" referred to by the court is
that "ownership of intangible personal property is controlled by the whole law
of the decedent's domicile at the time of death."49 This ill-advised stipulation,
to which the attorneys for the estate inexplicably agreed, however, does not
excuse the court from the responsibility it had to apply the law properly. It
should not have simply accepted the severely flawed choice-of-law analysis
stipulated by the parties.5

A.

WHY THE CHOICE OFTHE "WHOLE LAw" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
APPLIED BY THE COURT

When a litigant argues before a court that the law of a particular foreign
jurisdiction, rather than the law of the forum jurisdiction should apply in
determining the marital-property rights of a spouse, how should the forum
court respond? Any number of answers to this question have been offered.
One answer is that the court should generally not concern itself with foreign
law, and should apply its own local law as the default rule, perhaps with
certain, very limited, exceptions.51 Others, however, reject this default to local
forum law. In contrast, they propose different methods for identifying the law
to be applied. One such method requires the forum court to consider a variety
of factors in deciding what law to apply, such as the expectations of the parties,
efficiency, and the interests of the "international system," in order to identify
the law of the jurisdiction that is deemed to have the most significant

48. Id. at 711.2 (citing Borden v. Paul Revere Life Irs. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 375 (ist Cir. 1991)).
49. Id. at 71.
5 o . A court is not bound by the parties with respect to a question of law. See 83 CJ.S.
Stipulations § 28 (2017) (collecting cases). With respect to tax matters, courts have held that they
are not bound by a stipulation by the parties as to conclusions of law. See, e.g., Saviario v. Comm'r,
765 F.2d 643, 645 ( 7 th Cir. 1985) ("[W]hile the parties are free to stipulate to the factual
elements of the transactions, the court is not bound by the legal conclusions implied by the
terminology utilized."). More generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[i] n
determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source,... whether or
not submitted by a party." FED. R. CW. P. 441. The accompanying Advisory Committee Notes
state: "There is no requirement that the court give formal notice to the parties of its intention to
engage in its own research on an issue of foreign law which has been raised by them .... " Id.
advisory committee's note. Furthermore, "the court's determination of an issue of foreign law is
to be treated as a ruling on a question of 'law,' not 'fact,' so that appellate review will not be
narrowly confined by the 'clearly erroneous' standard of Rule 52 (a)." Id.
51.
See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH.
L. REV. 637 (1960) (describing how various courts should select choice of law).

2128

IOWA LAWREVIEW

[VOI. 103:2119

relationship to the issue.52 A third approach proffered by certain
commentators and courts is to weigh the relative stake of each of the relevant
jurisdictions' governmental interests.53 A fourth alternative to the default to
local law asserts that there should be a reference to a set of black-letter rules
that identify the law of a jurisdiction with a particular connection.54 A fifth
alternative to the default to local law ignores the need to choose any
jurisdiction's specific law and rather argues for the fashioning of a new
principle of substantive law from the best elements of the conflicting laws of
the involved jurisdictions.55 While hardly an exhaustive list,56 each of these
five approaches have achieved some prominence, because each rests on a
distinctive perspective of the role of foreign law, if any, in resolving a dispute
before a forum court.
With respect to the determination of ownership of property acquired by
either spouse or both spouses during marriage, jurisdictions with developed
systems of law have opted for one of three black-letter rules-partial
mutability, strict immutability, or total mutability.57 In so doing, they have
either neglected to consider or rejected those approaches considered above
that involve broader policy considerations or jurisprudential musings rather
than black-letter rules.5
However, this is not the end of the story. Regardless of the approach that
has been endorsed, it does not define precisely what is encompassed by the

52.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). The
Restatement (Second) approach was foreshadowed in an article by its Reporter. See Willis L.M.
Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679, 692-99 (1963).
However, the significant-relationship approach in practice often leads to the application of blackletter rules in various areas of law. In the context of marital-property rights, partial mutability is
applied except in rare circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 258
cunt. a. As such, the Restatement (Second) approach is in accord with overwhelming American
case law for nearly two hundred years. See supra text accompanying note 4.
53.

See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 192-93 (1963).

54.
This is the position of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws as further developed
by its Reporter, ProfessorJoseph Beale in A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.1, at 55 (1935). With regard to marital-property rights, the Restatement
(First) § 290 categorically applies the partial-mutability approach. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29o.
55.
See, e.g., Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their
Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347, 367-69
(1974) (discussing Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972)).
56.
For a summary of several of these approaches, see generally Symeon C. Symeonides,
American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st CenturY, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2OO).
57.

See supra notes 5-11 and accompanrying text.

58.
The black-letter partial-mutability approach is emphasized explicitly by the Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws § 290 and in actual application by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 259. This partial-mutability rule had previously been endorsed byJoseph Story.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 259 (AM. LAW INST. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29o; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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"law" to be applied. Specifically, does "law" include within its meaning the
conflict-of-laws rules of the jurisdiction chosen by the particular approach?
Or, does the choice of a particular jurisdiction's law reference only its
domestic law, without consideration of its conflict-of-laws rules? When the
First Circuit in Charaniaaccepted the stipulation of the parties to the "whole
law" of Belgium, they were agreeing that the conflict-of-laws rules of Belgium,
and notjust its domestic community-property law, should be applied.59
This decision by the First Circuit is a striking departure from the
prevailing rule in state and federal courts of the United States, which is to
apply only the domestic law of the jurisdiction indicated under the partialmutability approach when issues of marital-property rights are involved. 6° Had
the prevailing approach been applied in Charania, the determinative law
would have been Belgian domestic law. Under Belgian domestic law, Ms.
Dhanani, the decedent's spouse, would have obtained a community-property
interest in the Citigroup stock at the time of its acquisition. The stock would
not have been the decedent's to dispose of at the time of his death. Rather,
Mr. Charania would have owned only half of the shares, and his estate's tax
liability would have been considerably less than what was ultimately imposed.
Meanwhile, the court would have avoided the highly demanding and errorprone task of implementing the conflict-of-laws doctrine of a foreign country,
in this case, Belgium. Indeed, that endeavor is a primary source of the court's
analytically flawed opinion.
Curiously, it does not appear that the First Circuit even realized that it
was departing from a long line of precedent and commentary that explicitly
rejects a reference to the "whole law.''6 , In effect, the First Circuit was led
astray by assuming, that since the underlying matter was the transfer of
property at Mr. Charania's death, the conflict-of-laws principles that govern
succession should first be consulted. 6 2 Thus, the court began its analysis by
stating that, since the decedent died domiciled in Belgium, Belgian law
governs. 63 Under broadly accepted choice-of-law principles, when the right of
succession to intangibles like stock is involved, rather than marital property
rights in such intangibles, the law of the decedent's domicile at death controls
issues relating to their disposition. 6 4
What the court fails to consider is that before the proper disposition of
the decedent's estate can be determined pursuant to the domicile-at-death
conflicts-of-law rule in matters of succession, the property that he owned at

59.

SeeEstate ofCharaniav. Shulnan, 6o8 F. 3 d 67, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2oo).

6o.

See i. at 72 ("In the United States, courts have tended to favor the doctrine of mutability.").

61. Id. at 71.
62. See id.
at 71.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Reynolds, 283 N.E.2d 629, 630 (Ohio 1972) (illustrating that Ohio
uses the decedent's domicile at death as the controlling law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS

§

260 (AM. LAW INST. 197

); SCHOENBLUM,

supra note 2.
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death must be determined.65 In order to make that preliminary
determination, consideration must be given to whether the decedent's
spouse, on account of community property, owns an interest in property held
in the deceased spouse's name. 66 To answer that question, an inquiry into the
law governing the rights of a surviving spouse in such property, must be
pursued. This necessarily requires identifying the appropriate choice-of-law
approach. The First Circuit failed to do this.
Specifically, the First Circuit failed to consider the proper choice-of-law
for marital property rights as distinct from the choice-of-law for matters of
succession. In failing to do so, it made a critical error. Relying on the
agreement of the parties that the succession rule that requires reference to
the decedent's domicile at death as controlling, the First Circuit, in its
opinion, simply proceeds from the statement that Belgian law applies to
matters of succession, to the bare conclusion that the "whole law" of Belgium,
the domicile at the death of the decedent, applies as well for purposes of
determining the spouse's marital-property rights. 6 7 It fashions itself as sitting
as a Belgian court. 6 Presuming that a Belgian court would apply the "whole
law" of the nationality jurisdiction of the spouses at the time of their marriage
pursuant to the strict-immutability approach, the First Circuit concluded that
it was required to do so as well.6 9 In so doing, the First Circuit made two
striking analytical errors-it failed to apply the partial-mutability rule
observed by American courts and it proceeded to apply the "whole law" of the
foreign jurisdiction indicated rather than its domestic law.
B.

UNITED KINGDOM LAWIS NOT ENGLISHLAW

As just discussed, the First Circuit erroneously presumed that it must sit
as a Belgian court and that such court would apply the "whole law" of the
nationality jurisdiction. The First Circuit then proceeded to make another
striking analytical error. In accordance with the stipulation of the parties, the
court stated that, in "applying Belgian choice-of-law rules, [it] would look to
the whole law of the country of the spouses' common nationality,"7o adding,
in agreement with the parties, "that the country of the spouses' common
nationality is England."71
The footnote associated with this language states that the court "use [s]
'England' as a convenient shorthand for the United Kingdom. Both the

65.

See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 2, § 1 1.o2.

66.

See id.

67.
Estate ofCharania,6o8 F. 3 d at 71. The First Circuit appears to be taking the position that
it must decide marital property rights by sitting as a court at the domicile of the individual
decedent at death. No authority, however, is cited in support of this proposition. See generally id.
68.

See id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.
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decedent and his wife were born in Uganda, at a time when that country was
part of the United Kingdom. The parties have stipulated that they were
citizens of the United Kingdom at all relevant times."72
The First Circuit appears to be completely unaware that Uganda was part
of the British Empire, but never a part of the United Kingdom.73 More
importantly for the present analysis, the United Kingdom and England are
not synonymous. 74 Indeed, the United Kingdom consists of more than one
territorial unit with its own distinctive laws. 75 It would be as if a reference to
the law of the United States were automatically equated with the law of New
York.
The problem arises because, Belgium, like certain other countries,
required prior to 2004 the application of the law of the spouses' nationality
in determining matters of marital-property rights.76 If the nationality is that
of the United Kingdom, as with Mr. Charania and Ms. Dhanani, there is a
problem because the United Kingdom has no marital-property law, just as the
United States itself does not have such law.77 Reference, therefore, must be
made to a lawmaking political subdivision such as England or Scotland.
However, there is no direction in United Kingdom law as to which political
subdivision's law to reference.
Just as the United Kingdom has not provided a solution to this problem,
Belgium did not prior to 2004. In 2004, two years after Mr. Charania's death,
the newly enacted Belgian Code of Private International Law ("PIL")
addresses some of the problems that arise when the reference to a national
law is to a nation with no substantive marital-property law of its own, but has

72.
73.

Id. at 71 11.3.
SeeANTONYALLOTT, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 3-4 (1960).

74.
The problems arising from a reference to the national law of a country where the law is
made at the level of political subdivisions is analyzed in considerably greater depth in JOHN
DELATREFALCONBRIDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 2o2-16 (2ded. 1954); see also 1 DICEY

15TH EDITION, supra note 16, at 93 ("If, on the other hand, the English court allows the foreign
expert witness to assume that the national law of a British citizen is English law, as has been done
in other cases, it is basing its decision on a manifestly false premise.").
75.

PIPPAROGERSON, COLLIER'S CONFLICT OF LAWS 4 (4 th ed. 2013).

76.

The principle is reflected, for example, in the judicial decision reported in Antwerpen,

Oct. 26, 1999, REVUE GENERAL DE DROIT CIVIL BELGE-TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH BURGERLIJK

RECHT [TBBR-RGDC] 2001, 33 (Belg.); see also Alain Verbeke, Belgisch Erfrecht in Kort Bestek:
Met IPR-Aspecten en Praktische Tips Voor Nederbelgen [Basic Principles of Belgian Marital
Property and Inheritance Law: With Conflict of Laws Rules and Belgo-Dutch Cross Boarder
Issues] 75 (2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-175o864. Following the
enactment of the Belgian Code of Private International Law in 2004, Article 51 changed the rule
to the habitual residence of the spouses. The Belgian nationality rule was longstanding. See, e.g.,
1

FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 435

(George H. Parmele ed., 3 d ed. 1905) (noting how "several European states" emphasized that
some principles of law are national or local and should not "be enforced on subjects who are
temporarily residing within the bounds of a state").

77.

See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 2, § 9.o9.
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multiple legal systems that have their own marital-property laws.78 Section 2
and the subsequent flush paragraph of Article 17 of the PIL directs reliance
on the channeling rules in force under the foreign national law.79 If there are
no such rules, as is the case with the United Kingdom, then the law "with
which the natural person has the closest connections" or, if the law is
"applicable to different categories of persons... the legal system that has the
'
closest connections with the legal relationship.""S
But the PIL does not address the issue confronted in Charania-with
which political subdivision of the United Kingdom the decedent and his wife
have the "closest connections." The answer must be none, since they had no
palpable ties with any lawmaking political subdivision of the United Kingdom.
Several of the Belgian drafters recognized this gap in the Code, but simply
explained it away by noting that Belgium was not the only country with this
problem on account of the nationality choice of law.S'
Under these circumstances, what ought to be the solution when a court,
such as the First Circuit in Charania, encounters the issue?2 I concur with
conflict-of-laws theorist, John Delatre Falconbridge, who, building on the
work of the Italian conflicts theorist Rodolfo De Nova, concludes that the most
defensible solution is to stick with the domestic law of the forum (Belgium,
under the court's flawed decision to sit as a Belgian court), as any reference
to the national law "is meaningless or ineffective in the circumstances." 3
Applying this approach to the facts of Charania,Belgian domestic communityproperty law would apply. The PIL, Article 17, with its emphasis on the law
with which the individual "has the closest connections" would also point to
Belgian domestic law. 84
The argument could be made that there is no need to turn back to
Belgian domestic law, since none of the political subdivisions of the United
Kingdom enforce a community-property regime.5 However, this is far from

78.

CODE

DE

DROIT

INTERNATIONAL

PRVE

[hereinafter

CDIP]

[CODE

OF PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW] (Beig.).

§

79.

See id. art. 17,

8o.

Id.

81.

See Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren, General Provisions on the Conflict of Laws in the Belgian Code

2.

of Private International Law (2004), in

LIBER MEMORIALIS PETAR SARCEVIC:

UNIVERSALISM,

TRADITION, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 111, 12o-26 (J.Erauw et al. eds., 2oo6).

82.
In fact, the 2004 PIL does largely abandon nationality in favor of habitual residence,
with only a few exceptions. See, e.g., CDIP art. 51 (relating to the matrimonial-property regime).
83.

FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 74, at 2o8.

84.
CDIP art. 17. Admittedly, in other cases, it would not automatically default to the
forum's own law as Falconbridge urged. FALCONBRIDGE, supranote 74, at 2o8.
85.

But see CHRIS CLARKSON ET AL., COMMISSION EUROPEENNE,JAI/A

MATRIMONIAL

3

/ 2001

03, STUDYON

PROPERTY REGIMES AND THE PROPERTY OF UNMARRIED COUPLES IN PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNAL LAW 5-8

(2003)

(UK), http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.

de/daten/edz-k/gdj/03/england-report-en.pdf. ("[Wihile the act of marriage has no effect
upon the ownership of property [in the United Kingdom] and the rules concerning ownership
(legal and equitable) of the family home are the same irrespective of whether the parties are
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the end of the matter. Assuming England applies a strict-immutability
approach, it would not apply its domestic law, but rater that of Uganda,
where Mr. Charania and his wife had their first marital domicile. 6 On the
oter hand, Scotland, anoter political subdivision of the United Kingdom,
appears at the relevant time to have applied and may still apply a totalmutability approach. 7 That approach would require application of the law of
Belgium, not Uganda."8
C.

THE HAPHAZARD APPLICATHON OF THE "RENVOi" THEORY BY
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

The First Circuit in Charaniaasserted that, sitting as a Belgian court, it
must apply "the whole law of the country of the spouses' common
nationality,"9 which it incorrectly concludes is England. But, assuming for
purposes of discussion, the First Circuit's correlation of United Kingdom law
wit English law is correct, the question remains as to how confident it can be
as to what a Belgian court, not an American court, would determine is the
"whole law" of England and how a Belgian court would determine that an
English court would thereby apply the law of Uganda. It is submitted that a
court in the United States should be exceptionally wary of any attempt to
determine "law" by sitting as a foreign forum (i.e., Belgium) that expresses
itself in a foreign language, that operates a distinct non-common law legal
system that is populated by judges for whom the common-law method of
adjudication is alien, and that invests case law and scholarship wit different
authority than a U.S. court would. This is especially the case when the U.S.
court (the firstjurisdiction) must determine how a Belgian court (the second
jurisdiction) would conclude, sitting as an English court (te
third
jurisdiction), that an appropriate court of England, wit a different legal
system than Belgium, would apply Ugandan law (the fourth jurisdiction).
Unfortunately, there is no serious indication in the First Circuit's opinion of
an appreciation of the immensely problematic nature of the process in which
it has determined to engage.
Yet, let us also assume that the proper Belgian court would approach the
issue exactly as the First Circuit does. In this case, the Belgian court would
conclude that English conflict of laws requires the application of the strictimmutability approach to choice of law. Furter, the strict-immutability
approach would itself compel reference to the law of the marital domicile at

married or not, there are nevertheless numerous statutory provisions dealing with the property
relations between married persons....").
86.

See supra text accompanying note 45.

87.

See infra text accompanying notes 125-29.

88.
See MARSH, supra note 4, at io8 (discussing Lashley v. Hog (1804) 47 Eng. Rep. 1243,
1243); see infra text accompanying note 127-32 (discussing the House of Lords decision on
appeal from the Scottish Court of Session in Lashley, 47 Eng. Rep. at 1243).
89.

Estate of Charaniav. Shulman, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2OO) (emphasis added).
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the time of marriage-Uganda. Assuming, then, that Ugandan law should
apply, how then does the First Circuit, a federal court in the United States,
sitting as a Belgian court, reach its holding that English marital-property law,
not Ugandan law, governs? The answer reveals yet other troubling errors in
the First Circuit's analysis. These errors are rooted in the court's statement
that "the parties have stipulated that Uganda's marital property regime
corresponded, at the relevant time,9 to England's marital property regime."91
The referenced stipulation of the parties was a very crucial and faulty one
that the First Circuit should not have relied upon. First, it is substantively
incorrect. Uganda's marital-property regime at the time of Mr. Charania's
marriage, up to the present, is not clearly the same as England's regime.92
Second, the First Circuit does not explain why its reference to Uganda's
marital-property law does not also include a reference to Uganda's own
conflict-of-laws rules. After all, a Belgian court must apply England's whole
law, which would include its rules relating to conflict of laws. England, it turns
out, applies the same "foreign court" theory, whereby it sits as a court of the
foreign jurisdiction referenced93-in this case Uganda.
If Uganda's conflict-of-laws rules, were to be applied, what would be the
result? The answer to this question would depend on which marital-property
choice-of-law rule Uganda applied at the relevant time and whether the
reference to a foreign law included that foreign law's conflict-of-laws rules. If
Uganda applied the strict-immutability approach, while rejecting a reference
to its conflict-of-laws rules, then Ugandan domestic law, presumed to be the
same as English law, would govern the rights of the spouses. On the other
hand, if Uganda applied a partial-mutability approach while rejecting a
reference to the foreign jurisdiction's conflict-of-law rules, it would result in
the application of Belgian domestic community-property law, rather than
England's separate-property law. In contrast, if Uganda looks to the "whole
law" of Belgium, then this would require the application of English law, which
would, in turn, based on strict immutability, look to Ugandan law, and so
forth, resulting in a never-ending circularity.94
What is at issue here is the applicability of renvoi, although the First
Circuit failed to even mention the word, or the fact that the First Circuit was
running counter to the overwhelming tendency of American precedent and
commentators rejecting any role for it, especially with regard to marital-

90. What ifthe country changes its property law over time? This question is suggested by
the First Circuit but not addressed. The issue might also have affected the outcome in Charania,
but is not considered at all by the First Circuit. Id. at 73.
91.
Id. at 72.
92. See infra text accompanying note 104.
93.
SeeFALCONBRIDGE, supra note 74, at 172.
94. This is also known as "the ping-pong theory of renvoi." See id. at 187.
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property rights.95 Indeed, renvoi has now also been rejected by Belgian
scholars.9 6 Not the least of renvoi's many problems is one that resonates in
connection with Charania-relianceon foreign-law experts whose inevitably
conflicting conclusions cannot readily be adjudicated, especially when the
esoterica associated with a foreign jurisdiction's conflict-of-laws rules are at
issue.97 Of course, the fact that renvoi suffers from very limited acceptance
does not mean it should not be considered. However, the First Circuit in
Charaniaengaged in absolutely no discussion of the topic.98
"Renvoi" means a "remission" back to the forum through the application
by the forum of the foreign jurisdiction's whole law, rather than just its
domestic law.99 It was originally conceived as a means of assuring a reference
back to the forum's own law, when the forum applied a nationality rule and
the country of nationality applied a domicile rule.10 Thus, the forum could
give maximum weight to the contact point of nationality, while still justifying
the actual application of its own domestic law. Many jurisdictions opting for
renvoi only recognize this sort of one-step renvoi.oI Furthermore, the renvoi
is only allowed back to the domicile (forum) jurisdiction's domestic law and

95.
SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 258(1) (AM. LAWINST. 1971) ("The
interest of a spouse in a movable acquired by the other spouse during the marriage is determined
by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the movable under the principles stated in § 6." (emphasis
added)). Comment (b) to the section amplifies upon the foregoing rule: "Except in rare
circumstances, this state will be the state where the spouses were domiciled at the time the
movable was acquired.... [T]he local law of the state where the spouses were domiciled at the
time the movable was acquired will usually be applied to determine marital property interests
therein in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties." Id. § 258 cmt. b.
96.

The 2004 PIL eliminates renvoi, subject to a limited number of exceptions. CDIP art. 16.

97.
In this regard, see one of several classic critiques of renvoi by Ernest G. Lorenzen, The
Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 5o YALE LJ. 743
(1941 ), wherein Professor Lorenzen states:
Personally, I cannot approve a doctrine which is workable only if the other country
rejects it. Apart from that, I do not favor handing over our Conflicts problems to socalled experts on foreign private international law. It is difficult enough to get
accurate expert testimony with respect to foreign municipal law, but such testimony
is much more unreliable with respect to foreign Conflict of Laws. For these reasons
I should still regard the general acceptance of the renvoi doctrine in our law as most
unfortunate.
Id. at 753-5498.
Significantly, Dicey's 1 5 th edition of The Conflict of Laws recommends against
application of renvoi. DICEY 15TH EDITION, supra note 16, at 95. This is crucial in that the First
Circuit in Charaniarelies on Dicey's reading of De Nicols as authority for the foreign-court theory,
whereby an English court should sit as a foreign court under the choice of law and apply its whole
law. Estate of Charania v.Shulman, 6o8 F. 3 d 67, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2o o). In other words, Dicey is
credited by the court as authoritative when it supports the court's position, but when it would
yield a different outcome on account of the rejection of renvoi, it is ignored by the court.
99.

See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 2, § 9.10.

lOO.

SeeErwin N. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1 165, 1169-70 (1938).

101.

SeeMARSH, supra note 4, at 112-13.
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not its whole law. Otherwise, the circularity problem described above would
again be encountered. Additionally, one-step renvoi does not recognize a
"transmission" to a third jurisdiction, which might be indicated if the
nationality jurisdiction in the previous example looked to the law of the
habitual residence.
In theory, however, there is no logical basis for cutting off renvoi in these
ways. 0 2 If the assumption is that a reference to another jurisdiction's law
should include its whole law, then why stop at the firstjurisdiction referenced?
Some jurisdictions, concerned about the inefficiencies and potential for error
in references to a chain of foreign laws, but not prepared to settle on a
theoretically impure, one-step renvoi, limit the renvoi to two-steps, thus
permitting a transmission to a third jurisdiction's domestic law.1°3 However,
there is no persuasive theoretical justification for a two-step limit any more
than there is for a one-step limit.
The First Circuit in Charania, without explanation, applied a two-step
renvoi. In doing so it did not acknowledge that it was departing from
established American
conflict-of-laws principles. Moreover, though
purportedly sitting as a Belgian court, it offered no consideration of renvoi
under Belgian law. In fact, Belgium's approach to renvoi has oscillated
considerably, including at the relevant times for determining the marital
rights of Mr. Charania's spouse. Thus, there can be no confidence that the
First Circuit applied the whole law of Belgium, including renvoi, as a Belgian
court would have done so.
D.

UGANDANLAWIS

NOT IDENTICAL TO ENGLISHILAw

Assume, for purposes of discussion, that at the relevant time, Belgium
applied two-step renvoi. This should result in the marital-property rights of
Ms. Dhanani being determined under Ugandan domestic law, without regard
to its conflict-of-laws rules. Instead of applying Uganda's law, as discussed
above, the court conflates Ugandan and English domestic marital-property
law by stating that:
because the spouses were domiciled at the time of their nuptials in
Uganda, and because the parties have stipulated that Uganda's
marital property regime corresponded, at the relevant time, to
England's marital property regime, the doctrine of immutability
would call for application of England's marital property regime.
That is a separate property regime .... 104
Again, the default to English law is without foundation. However, let us
assume for purposes of discussion that it is correct. Apparently, because of the

102.

See Griswold, supra note loo, at 1177.

103.

See, e.g., FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 74, at 183.

104.

Estate of Charania v. Shulman, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2OO).
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parties' stipulation, the First Circuit did not feel the need to offer support for
the assertion that Uganda's law "corresponded" to English marital-property
law in 1967 when the spouses married in Uganda. This is unfortunate,
because it is far from clear that the stipulation is correct. Precisely what
Ugandan marital-property law was at the time the Charanias married, which
was after Uganda gained its independence, is exceptionally difficult to
determine. 105
Uganda received via the East Africa Order in Council "the substance of
the common law, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes of general
application in force in England on August 12, 1897."1 ° 6 English law at the
time and to date recognizes separate property ownership and does not
recognize community property. 0 7 Thus, the First Circuit appears, at first
glance, to have serendipitously reached the correct answer in stating that
Ugandan law corresponded to English law. But this facile conclusion does not
hold up upon deeper consideration. In fact, English law was residual law in
Uganda, subject to the proviso that English law should be in force only insofar
"as the circumstances of the Protectorate [of East Africa, including Uganda]
and its inhabitants and the limits of His Majesty's jurisdiction permit, and
subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary.",-'
For example, religious affiliation often proves crucial in determining
property rights under Ugandan law. The First Circuit was, apparently, not
aware of this fact. We are not informed of the religion of the Charanias. If
they were Muslim, then English common law definitely would not have
applied to them, as there was and is a separate legal regime in place for
Muslims.1o9 If they were Hindu, the law is quite murky.11 ° To begin with, there
is not a uniform Hindu marital-property law. Not only do different sects from
different regions of India observe different rules, but Hindu law, as applied
to locals in the British East African protectorates of Uganda, Kenya, and

105.
SeeALLOTT, supra note 73, at 3-5 1. Technically, Uganda did preserve the prior common
law at the time of its independence via the Judicature Act 1966, § 14. However, what that common
law was is quite uncertain, as even prior to independence the question was fraught with difficulty.
While English common law was generally received in Uganda, the reception was not wholesale and
involved many twists and turns as the courts responded to local circumstances and needs. See id.
io6. East Africa Order in Council, 19o2, Stat. R. & 0. No. 2, as amended by the East Africa
Order in Council of 1911, art. 15.
107.

See CLARKSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 5.

io8. East Africa Order in Council, 19o2, Stat. R. & 0. No. 2, as amended by the East Africa
Order in Council of 1911, art. 15.
109.
J.N.D. Anderson, ColonialLaw in Tropical Africa: The Conflict Between English, Islamic and
Customary Law, 35 IND. LJ. 433, 437 (1960).

110.
SeeJ. Duncan M. Derrett, EastAfirica: Recent Legislationfor Hindus, 11 AM.J. COMP. L. 396,
397 (1962). Unlike Muslims, Hindus were not exempted from the Uganda Succession
Ordinance, 19o6 (Cap. 34), s. 5o. See Derrett, supra, at 403 n.49. However, there is a Ugandan
statute indicating distinctive treatment for Hindus in the context of marriage, but not necessarily
with respect to marital-property rights. See infra text accompanying notes 113-15.
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conditions.111 Furthermore, there were also local statutory enactments.

Seeking a unified approach, Uganda enacted a Hindu Marriage and
Divorce Act of 1961, which remains in effect to this day.112 The law seeks to
regulate marriages and matrimonial causes of Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and
certain Buddhists. Specific conditions justifying divorce are addressed in the
statute, but the precise issue of marital-property rights is not. Subsequent
attempts to clarify the ambiguous situation with regard to marital property
appear to have failed, thereby leaving the substance of the rights of Hindu
couples in abeyance and unsetled.113 Indeed, as there is no statute that
specifically addresses Hindu marital-property rights, the secular maritalproperty law arguably applies. The substance of that law is highly uncertain
and no precise rules have developed to date.114 In 2013, the Ugandan
Supreme Court confirmed this conclusion in Rwabinumi v. Bahimbisomwe.115
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, in 2oo8, the Uganda Court of Appeals
had ruled that, since the adoption of the Uganda Constitution in 1997, all
property brought into the marriage, as well as that acquired during marriage,
6
was 'joint property," that is, each spouse had an automatic 50% interest.11 Of
course, Mr. Charania acquired the Citigroup shares in 1997.117
However, Rwabinumi reversed this ruling, and held that there is no
absolute right under the Constitution in support of the Court of Appeals'
position.11s Nevertheless, in its opinion the Supreme Court did not actually
address what the law is. The court did agree with Muwanga v. Kintu, an
unreported case decided in the same year Mr. Charania acquired the
Citigroup stock, that that decision "rightly pointed out the challenges that
courts will continue to face in determining what constitutes matrimonial
property in Uganda."119 In this regard, Rwabinumi implores the "[Ugandan]

111.
The vast majority of Indians, both Hindu and Muslim, in Uganda were from Gujarat. See
Palash Ghosh, Uganda: The Legacy of ldiAmin's Expulsion of Asians in 1972, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ugarlda-legacy-idi-amirns-expulsion-asiais-1972-214289.
112.
See Derrett, supra note 1 o, at 397-98; There Is Need to Review the Law on Marriageand
Divorce, NEWVISION (Sept. 1, 2011, 3:oo AM), https://www.riewvisiori.co.ug/new vision/news/
1005919/review-law-marriage-divorce.
113.
This failure is reflected in unsuccessful efforts, generally, to clarify the marital-property
rules. See Anthony Luyirika Kafumbe, Women's Rights to Property in Marriage,Divorce, and Widowhood
in Uganda: The ProblematicAspects, ii HUM. RTS. REV. 199, 199-201 (2010).
114. Informally, separate property ownership is probably widespread. This is primarily due
to the weaker position of women in Uganda and their difficulty in asserting rights that they may
otherwise have. See id. at 203-04.
115. Julius Rwabinumi v. Hope Bahimbisomwe, (2013), Civ. App. No. io (2oo9), U.G.S.C. 5
(Uganda), https://ulii.org/node/15687.
116. Julius Rwabinumi v. Hope Bahimbisomwe, (2oo8), Civ. App. No.
U.G.C.A. 19 (Uganda), https://ulii.org/ug/judgment/court-appeal/2oo8/ 19.
117.

Estate of Charaniav. Shulman, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2OO).

1 18.

Rwabinumi, (2013) U.G.S.C. 5.

119.

Id.

io8.

30

(2007),
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Parliament to enact a law that clearly defines what constitutes
marital/matrimonial property as opposed to individually held property of
married persons." 120
The Uganda Supreme Court's opinion in Rwabinumi hardly establishes
that Uganda had in force the categorical English rule of separate property.
Rather, it demonstrates that the stipulation of the parties in Charaniawas a
superficial statement of Ugandan law and that, whether in 1967, 1997, or in
2002, there simply may not have been a settled marital-property law in
Uganda. To the extent that is the case, there was no basis for the First Circuit's
reference to English law on the basis that English law and Ugandan law
correspond. Under the circumstances, it seems far more likely that a Belgian
court would reference Belgian domestic law, as there was no other definitive
law to reference with respect to the respective property rights of long-term
Belgium-domiciled spouses.
The foregoing consideration of Ugandan domestic marital-property law
was required under the assumption of a Belgian two-step renvoi. But what if
the proper Belgian court would have applied total renvoi? It would then be
required to consider Uganda's marital-property choice-of-law rule. To the
extent that Uganda's choice-of-law rule corresponds to English law (which is
hardly a safe assumption) the argument could be made that the rule of strict
immutability applies, as per the House of Lords decision in the case of De
Nicols v. Curlier.12 The problem is that De Nicols (the case the Charaniacourt
heavily relies upon to establish that the English approach is strict
immutability) was decided by the House of Lords in 19oo.122 This was two
years before Uganda officially received English common law, but this does not
mean that De Nicols became part of Ugandan common law. The reason is that
the legislation receiving English common law had a cutoff date of 1897, three
years before the De Nicols decision.123 Prior to De Nicols, the House of Lords
had not settled on the strict-immutability approach. Indeed, common law at
the time suggested a rule of total mutability rather than strict immutability.
The very same House of Lords that decided De Nicols had a century earlier
decided a case (Lashley v. Hog)124 that was unquestioned at the time. This case
held that when an Englishman, who had acquired property while domiciled
in England, died domiciled in Scotland, the property that had been separate
property, became subject at his death to the Scottish communio bonorum, a
loose form of community property. 125 Indeed, Lord Eldon explicitly stated

120.

Id. 11

121.

De Nicols v. Curlier [19oo] A.C. 21 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).

122.

Id.

123.

See supra text accompanying note i o6.

124.

Lashleyv. Hog (1804) 47 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1243.

125.

Id. at 1263-65.

5

.
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that marital-property rights were mutable and changed with changes in
6
domicile.12
Furthermore, while the strict-immutability approach of De Nicols would
appear to be in direct conflict with Lashley,127 this may not, in fact, be the case.
The Lords deciding the matter had diverse approaches to distinguishing the
two cases, as have leading commentators.12
The Lord Chancellor
distinguished the two cases principally on the ground that Lashley did not
involve community property at all, as Scottish law's communio bonorum was not
really community property.1 29 Thus, the rule of decision in Lashley was not in
conflict because it was simply applying the rule that in matters of succession,
as opposed to marital-property rights, the final domicile of the decedent,
controls.13 ° This is the position that the First Circuit in Charaniastrenuously
adopted in distinguishing Lashley.131 In so doing, it totally neglected the
opinions of the other Lords in De Nicols, as well as the views of many
distinguished commentators. 132
In fact, at the time that De Nicols was decided, the outcome in that case
was deemed by the prestigious JuridicalReview as distinguishable from Lashley
on the ground that there was an implied marital contract in De Nicols based
on the unique French law approach at play in that case.1 33 Indeed, this had
been the position taken by several of the Lords, other than the Lord
Chancellor.134 Dicey on the Conflict of Laws, the leading English treatise on
conflict of laws, which had initially contended that Lashley was a succession

126.
Id. at 1261; see also Darrell E. Burns, Jr., De Nichols [sic] v. Curlier: Revisited, 14
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 797, 799 (1976) ("Lord Eldon stated that the spouses' matrimonial property
rights were mutable with changes in their domicile.").
127.

MARSH, supra note 4, at 107 ("Obviously, they are primafacie in conflict.").

128.

See id. at 107-o8.

129.

Burns, supra note 126, at 8oi.

130.
Id. The characterization of Scottish marital-property rights at the time has been severely
criticized. See id. at 803-04.
131.
Estate of Charartia v. Shulman, 6o8 F. 3 d 67, 73 r1.6 (1st Cir. 2OO). The First Circuit
cites to DICEY 14TH EDITION, supra note 16, at 1299, for the proposition that there is no English
authority for the mutability theory. See Estate of Charania,6o8 F.3 d at 73-74. In fact, in the most
recent edition of the treatise, the authors state: "The exact limits of the principle established in
DeNicols v. Curlier have never been settled." 2 DICEY 15TH EDITION, supra note 16, at 1482.
132.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 73-74.

133.
Notes on Decided Cases, Effect of Change of MatrimonialDomicile on Community of Goods or
Marriage-Contract,12 JURID. REV. 213, 213-14 (1900).
134. Id. at 214. Nevertheless, the First Circuit claims that "the text of De Nicols belies this
reading," failing to note the several Lords' opinions at the time endorsing this very reading. Estate
ofCharania,6o8 F. 3 d at 74. CompareDIcEY & MORRIS, ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws io68 (I i th ed.
1987) (offering a far narrower reading of the significance of the De Nicols decision and
recognizing the differences among the Lords), with 2 DiCEY 14TH EDITION, supra note 16, at i299.
It is noteworthy that, contrary to the First Circuit reading, a leading American treatise on conflict
of laws, EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 1 ( 4 th ed. 2004), endorses the narrow
reading of De Nicols as turning on an implied contract under French law.
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case, had subsequently altered its position.135 The First Circuit in Charania
acknowledged the change in position of Dicey.136 However, it noted a still later
edition of the treatise, the 14 th edition, in which Dicey shifts yet again back to
the view that strict immutability is the rule in England on the authority of De
Nicols and that Lashley is a succession case. 137
Notwithstanding the First Circuit's reliance on the interpretation of the
cases set forth in the 14 th edition of Dicey, the 1 4 th edition was not published
until 2oo6, four years after Mr. Charania's death.1s More pertinent is the
position of Dicey in 1967 when Mr. Charania and Ms. Dhanani married and in
1997 when the Citigroup stock was acquired by Mr. Charania.139 The most
recent edition prior to the acquisition of the stock, the 8th edition, consistent
with editions going back to the 5 th edition in 1932, known as the Keith
edition, as well as the 1 3 th edition published in 2ooo and in effect at Mr.
Charania's death in 2oo2, all recognized the English approach as being one
of total mutability, in accord with Lashley. De Nicols was essentially cast as a
narrow exception to the general rule of mutability, based on the French law
of implied contract.
Of course, the preoccupation with Dicey is itself questionable and strange
to lawyers in the United States, where treatises are routinely consulted, but
hardly are regarded as authoritative and certainly are not deemed conclusive.
Moreover, Dicey was not and is not the only respected English commentary on
the case, although the First Circuit did not appear to be aware of this. While
the original characterization of Lashley as a "succession case" not in conflict
with De Nicols received support from several other commentators as well,14
certain commentators, including the leading competitor to Dicey, that is,
Cheshire, Private International Law, endorsed the French implied-contract
theory as the proper reading of De Nicols,141 thereby treating it as a narrow
exception to Lashley, rather than the case that overruled it and instituted the
strict-immutability approach in England. Yet, just as Dicey has equivocated, so
has Cheshire.This treatise eventually abandoned its broad reading of Lashley in
favor of the "succession case" reading originally propounded and then
abandoned by Dicey,142 who switched, during the relevant time, to Cheshire's
original view that total mutability was the controlling English rule.
135.

See Estate of Charania,6o8 F.3 d at 73-74.

136.

Id.

137.

Id.

138.

See id. at 69, 72.

139.

See id. at 69.

140.

See JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, WITH PRINCIPAL

REFERENCE TO ITS PRACTICE IN ENGLAND 79-80 ( 5 th ed. 1912); see also FALCONBRIDGE, supranote

74, at 106-07 n.(h) (listing authorities supporting and contradicting the idea that De Nicols was
about succession).
141.

G.C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 494-98 (2d ed. 1938).

142.

G.C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

note 4, at 107-o8.
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5

02 ( 4 th ed. 1952); seeMARSH, supra
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Other highly respected scholars have also expressed alternative readings
of the cases and just what the English choice-of-law rule is. For example,
Martin Wolff, in his thoughtful work, PrivateInternationalLaw, concluded that
the English rule is that when the marital domicile shifts from a common-law
property to community-property jurisdiction, total mutability applies,
arguably, the Lashley holding.143 On the other hand, if there is a shift from a
community-property law to common-law-property jurisdiction, strict
immutability applies, arguably the De Nicols holding.144 Applying Wolff's
statement of English law, an English court would decide that total mutability
applied in Charania,as Mr. Charania and Ms. Dhanani had a marital domicile
at the time of Mr. Charania's death in Belgium, a community-property
jurisdiction.
What all this suggests is that at times relevant to the determination of Mr.
Charania's ownership interest there was considerable division as to the
English marital-property choice-of-law rule. But even if the reading of De Nicols
by the First Circuit was the settled Englishlaw, this would not mean that it was
the controlling choice-of-law rule in Uganda. Again, Ugandan law did not
receive the De Nicols decision into its common law. While Ugandan courts
could choose to follow it, they would not be required to do so, as they would
have been had it been in effect in 1897.145 Alternatively, they might consider
themselves bound by the interpretation of Lashley as instituting total
mutability, the interpretation that was widely in effect before the De Nicols
decision was handed down in 19oo. Admittedly, no one can be certain, as
there is no record of either of these decisions having been cited or otherwise
relied upon by Ugandan courts or incorporated into Ugandan legislation.
In sum, whether English or Ugandan "whole law" were applied by the
First Circuit sitting as a Belgian court, it is clear that the First Circuit's
conclusion that the English domestic regime of separate property applies is
not sustainable. To the extent the renvoi stops at Ugandan domestic law, it is
entirely unclear what that law was or is currently. If total renvoi applies, the
outcome seems to point in the direction of total mutability and Belgian
domestic law of community property. Likewise, if the First Circuit had applied
the standard choice-of-law rule applied typically in the United States by
federal and state courts-the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws rule
of partial mutability without renvoi-then Belgian domestic law of community
property would apply.

143.
MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 365-69 (1945). It is not clear whether
Wolff would apply the "foreign court" theory as well in conjunction with the total-immutability
approach, which could alter the outcome.
144.

Id.

145.

SeeALLOTT, supra note 73, at 32-33.
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THE APPLICATHON OF STRICT IMMUTABILITY TO EXILES

The estate in Charania argued that Ugandan law (stipulated as
corresponding to English law) should not apply because the decedent and his
spouse had been exiled from Uganda in 197 2, along with the other Ugandans
of Asian descent.14 6 All of their property had been expropriated.147 The
Citigroup stock, along with other valuable property, had been acquired after
8
being exiled and while resident in Belgium. 14
Following the overthrow of Amin in 1979, Uganda revoked the laws that
had been enforced against Asians and welcomed them back. 149 The decedent
and his spouse did not return. 150 This strongly indicates their endorsement of
a newly acquired Belgian marital domicile and their governance under its
property rules, as well as a decisive repudiation of ties to Uganda and a
property-law system that had permitted the expropriation of all that they
owned. However, under the First Circuit's blinkered analysis, the Charanias
remained tied to the property law of the offending original marital
domicile.151
The First Circuit was dismissive of the Charanias' argument that the law
of the country that exiled them should not determine their marital-property
rights, especially with respect to subsequently acquired property. Indeed, the
First Circuit stated that "it is far from clear that an English court would
necessarily view this distinction[1521 either as meaningful or as cutting in favor
of adopting a rule of mutability." 153 Apart from this statement, the First Circuit
offered no analysis.
The argument the estate presented, however, highlights a rather
disturbing weakness of the strict-immutability approach-that spouses must
remain bound to the property law of the very jurisdiction that has expelled
them and expropriated their property. Worse, this is the case even if the
expropriation was indisputably discriminatory in blatant violation of
fundamental principles of international law, as the facts of Charaniareveal.
Ironically, the court failed to consider how Dicey, which the court regarded as
the ultimate authority when it comes to marital-property choice of law,154
treats involuntary exiles. Had it done so, it would have discovered that this
authority, while not addressing exile specifically in the context of maritalproperty rights, concludes, that in the case of involuntary exile, the exiled

146.

Estate ofCharaniav. Shulman, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2OO).

147.

Id.

148.

Id.

149.

See Ghosh, supra note 111.

150.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 69.

151.

Id. at 77.

152.

That is, the difference between voluntarily departure and involuntary exile.

153.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 74.

154.

See supranote 131.
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person should be delinked from the offending domicile. 155 In reaching this
conclusion, te treatise relies on case law that lends support to the conclusion
that strict mutability should not be applied by an English court in situations
6
like Charania.15
The First Circuit does respond as well by pointing out that the spouses
were free under Belgian law to elect community property and failed to do so.
Of course, this would have required them to anticipate the thoroughly flawed
conflicts analysis of the First Circuit while they were still alive, a not
insignificant challenge of foresight and predictive capability.
Finally, the First Circuit incorrectly shaped the issue as a binary choice
between strict immutability and total mutability. However, the allowance of a
one-time exception based on involuntary exile would not constitute a
repudiation of the strict-immutability approach and adoption of the totalmutability approach at all. By simply deeming the first marital domicile after
exile and expropriation to be immutable, the preference for strict
immutability could be preserved, but not at the price of an entirely
mechanistic and blatantly unjust outcome. This approach would also have
spared the estate the heavy tax burden it was forced to endure as a result of
the First Circuit's flawed analysis.
F.

ERIE, FEDERAL QUESTIONS, AND THE PROPER CHOICE OFLAWBYA HDERAL
COURT

As previously explained, the First Circuit never actually considered what
choice-of-law rule it should apply to the question of marital-property rights. It
simply concluded that since the decedent died domiciled in Belgium, Belgian
conflict-of-laws rules regarding marital-property rights should apply. This led
it to English law and the decision in De Nicols v. Curlier, which the court
construed as imposing the strict-immutability approach. In fact, the First
Circuit, first and foremost sitting as a federal court, should have recognized
the Erie/Bosch issues implicated by its approach. In Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,157 the Supreme Court held that a federal court wit diversity
jurisdiction is bound to apply the substantive law of the state in which the
federal trial court sits.15s The court explained that "[e]xcept in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State." 159
Erie did not address wheter the federal courts in diversity actions were
also required to apply the state's law regarding the conflict of laws. If not,
could the federal court apply a distinct federal choice-of-law rule when the

155.

SeeDICEY 1 5 TH EDITION, supra note 16, at 156-57.

156.

SeeMay v. May [1943] 2 All ER 146, 148-49 (Eng.).

157.

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

158.

Id. at 7 8.

159.

Id.
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conflict of laws was involved? In Klaxon Co. v. StentorElectricManufacturing Co.,
the Supreme Court held that a federal court was, indeed, required to apply
the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which it sits., 6 ° The Court's opinion
explained that if the state's conflict-of-laws rules were not also applied, the
"principle of uniformity within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is
based" would be undermined.161 For example, if a federal common law of
conflicts could be applied by the federal district court, and it resulted in a
different choice of governing substantive law than the conflicts rules applied
by state courts, the state's citizens might be exposed to differing substantive
outcomes depending on which court within the state's geographic bounds
served as the forum. This would violate Erie's edict regarding uniformity. 62 In
addition to undercutting uniformity, it would encourage forum shopping.
The principles set out in Erie and Klaxon, and their progeny, were not
extended to "matters governed ... by Acts of Congress,"163 such as the IRC.
Thus, the question presents itself, what choice-of-law principles apply when a
tax dispute is before a federal district court, the Court of Federal Claims, or
the Tax Court, as in Charania?These three are the exclusive fora for resolving
disputes involving federal taxes between a taxpayer and the federal
government. Importantly, federal district courts and the Court of Federal
Claims, can only hear refund claims.164 That is, the taxpayer must pay the tax
assessment before commencing refund litigation against the IRS. On the
other hand, the Tax Court can decide a taxpayer challenge prior to the
taxpayer's having to pay the tax assessment.1 65
The ownership rights of spouses can have a direct impact on their
respective federal transfer tax and income tax liability. However, the law
concerning the marital-property rights of spouses is not set forth in the IRC,
and, thus, the substantive law must be derived from some other source.
Ordinarily, federal tax law looks to state law to determine such substantive
marital-property law.166 But there is astonishingly little examination of what
the choice-of-law approach should be in arriving at the governing substantive
law of marital-property rights.
When a federal bankruptcy matter is at issue, analogous choice-of-law
questions arise. Here, too, there is an act of Congress that must be enforced,
and reliance must be placed on state substantive property laws, including
those relating to marital-property rights. Although there are not specialized

i6o.

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).

161.

Id.

162.

The Klaxon court did not actually address whether conflict-of-laws rules are part of the

substantive law of a state. See id. at 487

163.

.

This is actually a complex issue with many ramifications.

Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

164.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2o12).

165.

I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2o12).

166. See Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 8o (1940) ("State law creates legal interests and
rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.").

2146

IOWA LAWREVIEW

IVOI- 103:2119

courts like the Court of Federal Claims and the Tax Court, the federal district
courts, as with federal tax controversies, do serve as a proper forum. In the
federal bankruptcy setting, there has been a good deal of consideration of this
conflict-of-laws question. A sharp division among the circuits exists. In
particular, the Ninth Circuit has opted for application of a distinct federal
common law.16 7 The primary justifications for this approach are that forum
shopping will be discouraged and "[t]he value of national uniformity of
approach need not be subordinated, therefore, to differences in state choice
of law rules.'' , 6s These values are important, as Congress has enacted a
6
national bankruptcy law.1 9
Indeed, with respect to federal taxation, one can imagine a situation in
which two similarly situated taxpayers are seeking a tax refund in federal
district courts in different circuits. If choice-of-law rules of the states in which
the taxpayers reside differ, then the taxpayers could incur different federal
tax liabilities on identical facts. This would violate the overriding tax law
principle that persons similarly situated ought to be taxed similarly. 17
But how then do courts urging application of state choice-of-law rules
justify their stance? In In re Gaston & Snow,171 a federal bankruptcy case, the
Second Circuit explained:
We recognize the concerns expressed by these courts, but do not
believe they implicate significant enough federal interests to justify
the creation of federal common law in this case. While an interest in
uniformity can justify the creation of federal common law, Klaxon
rejected the need for uniformity as ajustification for displacing state
conflicts rules. Regarding the federal interest in avoiding forum
shopping, we believe there are only a limited number of cases in
which this interest is implicated. Here, for example, where the

167.

See In re Lindsay, 59 F- 3 d 942, 948 (9

th

Cit. 1995) ("In federal question cases with

exclusive jurisdiction in federal court, such as bankruptcy, the court should apply federal, not
forum state, choice of law rules.").
168.
Id.; see also In reE. Livestock Co., 547 B.R. 277, 282-85 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2o16) (noting
federal interests as a variable in choice-of-law determinations). See generally KimberlyJ. Winbush,
Annotation, Determination Whether Bankruptcy Court Should Apply Choice-ofLaw Rules of Forum State
in Which It Sits or Choice-ofLaw Rules of FederalCommon Law, 21A.L.R- FED. 3 d Art. 2 (2017) (discussing
decisions that have identified federal interests when making choice-of-law determinations).
169.

See In reE. Livestock Co., 547 B.R. at 282-83, 285.

17o.
This principle is commonly described as horizontal equity in the income tax context.
See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,88 HARV. L. REV. 532, 535 (1975). This does not mean all
uniformiity can be achieved. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 5

(2d series 1938) ("We shall get nowhere rapidly with the problem of simplification until we
recognize that what we bravely call uniformity on a national scale is a myth.").
171.
In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F-3 d 599, 6o6 (2d Cir. 2oo); see also In reMerritt Dredging
Co., 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4 th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Klaxon rule should be applied when a
bankruptcy court is seeking to determine the property interest of the debtor).
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debtor was brought into bankruptcy court through an involuntary
petition, it is difficult to argue that any forum shopping occurred.172
In the federal tax setting (unlike the involuntary bankruptcy setting) the
taxpayer alone determines the forum, and has several choices.173 Thus, an
opportunity for forum shopping is built into the system. That opportunity
most typically hinges on whether the taxpayer is able and prepared to pay the
tax assessment first or not. If not burdened by the need to go to Tax Court
because of a lack of resources to pay the tax assessment first, the taxpayer will
be free to consider which of the three fora has more favorable substantive tax
opinions or more sympatheticjudges, as well as whether ajury trial is desired,
which is only available in the federal district courts. However, as long as there
is a uniform rule regarding choice of law by federal tax fora, there will be no
real opportunity to shop for a more favorable state law. Whether the forum is
a federal district court, the Tax Court, or the Court of Federal Claims, the
unitary conflict-of-laws rule will point each of these courts to the same
controlling state law. As a result, the law determining the respective ownership
rights of spouses with respect to marital property will be the same on the same
facts regardless of the federal forum chosen.
On the other hand, if resort is made to the conflict-of-laws rule of the
state in which the district court hearing a federal tax matter sits, the
theoretical possibilities for different outcomes on the same facts increases
significantly. Furthermore, if the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims,
though national courts headquartered in the District of Columbia, 174 are also
bound to invoke state conflict-of-laws rules, the possibilities are further
magnified. Not surprisingly, these courts have tended strongly toward a
federal rule based on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 175
In re Gaston & Snow fails to explain in any meaningful way why the interest
in uniformity should not, in fact, be accorded primacy. Indeed, Erie and
Klaxon make clear that when an act of Congress is involved the same
federalism calculus is not in play as in the diversity setting. When an act of
Congress, such as the IRC, is at issue, the particular stake that a state has in
uniform enforcement of its laws by courts within its geographic borders does
not exist. Because state legislators and courts do not deal with federal tax

172.

In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3 d at 6o6 (citations omitted).

173.

See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.

174. Although headquartered in the District of Columbia, thejudges of the Tax Court travel,
hearing cases throughout the country. Arguably, then, the Tax Court might apply the choice-oflaw rule of the state in which it is sitting on a particular tax case. Indeed, this was the approach
in Sartori v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 68o, 689 (1976) (relying on Pennsylvania choice-of-ldw rule
because court was trying case in Pittsburgh).
175.
The Restatement (Second) is not the only alternative for a unitary rule. See, e.g., Edmond
N. Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE LJ. 799, 820-23 (1943) (predicting the
development of unique conflict-of-laws rules emphasizing economic situs, although built on
otherwise applicable conflict-of-laws principles).
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matters and would not craft their choice-of-law rules to further federal
interests in achieving uniformity of federal tax result, deference to state law is
in most circumstances unwarranted.
In practice, federal courts and state courts have not been at odds when it
comes to choice of law. Federal courts have generally looked to the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. In the context of marital-property
rights, the Restatement (Second) rules as to choice of law are largely derived
from consistently enforced state court decisions.17 6 Whether federal common
law or state choice-of-law rules are applied, the partial-mutability approach
reigns.177 As this Article demonstrates, the First Circuit in Charania,without
obvious awareness that it was doing so, adopted an approach urged by the
litigants that implicitly rejected this dominant approach. By opening up
property-law determinations that underlie tax determinations to the diverse
choice-of-law rules of foreignjurisdictions, it has effectively rejected a uniform
choice-of-law rule for federal courts in federal tax matters.
G.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OFCOMMISSIONER V. ESTATE OF BOSCH

The preceding consideration of Erie and its progeny and more generally,
the interaction between conflict-of-laws and federal statutes, is not the end of
the matter. The First Circuit essentially deduced that, since it was sitting as a
Belgian court, it owed deference to Belgian conflict-of-laws rules because in a
diversity matter it would owe deference to the conflict-of-laws rules of the state
in which it sits. As support, the First Circuit's opinion actually cites two federal
court decisions for the proposition "that, when Called upon to apply state law,
a federal court should normally 'take state law as it finds it."'178 The two cases
cited, A. W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton and Kassel v. Gannett Co., however, were
diversity cases and not a matter governed by an act of Congress.179 They were
also cases in which the federal court could look to a prior determination of
the highest court of the state with respect to the issue being litigated.11S In
Erie, the Supreme Court indicated that federal courts are bound by the acts of

176.

See cases cited in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 258 (AM. LAW INST.

1971) and RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).

177.
Arguably, the total-mutability approach, by contrast, would violate the due process
2
clause as "a disturbance ofa vested right." In reEstate of Thornton, 33 P. d 1, 3 (Cal. 1934). The
adoption of a conflict-of-laws rule does not violate the due process clause if not arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair, that is, the state having its law apply "must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
Presumably, a rioncitizen, not resident in the United States would have no such rights. Cf. Kerry
v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015) (finding that it was not a violation of due process rights of
wife legally in United States to deny visa to nonresident, rioncitizen husband without explanation
because he has no right to immigrate).
178.

Estate of Charania v. Shulmar, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2oo) (citing AW. Chesterton Co.

v. Chesterton, 128 F. 3 d 1, 7 (1st Cit. 1997); Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 950 (1st Cit. 1989)).

179.

SeeA.W. Chesterton Co., 128 F. 3 d at 7; Kasse, 875 F.2d at 949-50.

i8o.

A.W. Chesterton Co., 128 F. 3 d at 5; Kasse, 875 F.2d at 941.
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the legislature and the "highest court" of the state. iSI The "proper regard" to
be shown lower courts, as well as the standard for determining whether the
highest court had decided the actual issue before a federal court, and whether
the deference owed to state courts applies to courts of foreign countries, were
8
not addressed.1
2 These questions are important in evaluating the Charania
opinion, inasmuch as the First Circuit never addressed them.
Another very troubling omission by the court is its utter disregard of the
most critical precedent bearing on the questions posed in the preceding
paragraph, that is, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner
v. Estate of Bosch.IS3 In that case, which goes unmentioned in Charania, the
Supreme Court confronted the specific question whether the decrees of lower
courts, in Bosch a probate court, are "binding on a federal court in subsequent
litigation involving federal revenue laws." 114 The Court "h [e]l d that where the
federal estate tax liability turns upon the character of a property interest held
and transferred by the decedent under state law, federal authorities are not
bound by the determination made of such propertyinterest by a state trial
court."18 5 Endorsing language in King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America (a post-Erie opinion), the Supreme Court in Bosch states: "Moreover,
even in diversity cases this Court has further held that while the decrees of
'lower state courts' should be 'attributed some weight.., the decision [is] not
controlling ... ' where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the
point.' ' ,16 Furthermore, "[i]f there be no decision by that court then federal
authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving 'proper
regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State." 187
Since Bosch, lower federal courts have not been especially concerned with
the "proper regard" requirement. In an empirical study of cases through the
end of 1992, Paul L. Caron determined that virtually all federal courts either
engage in de novo review of state laws, simply ignore state law, or pay mere "lip
service" to state law.,SS While highly critical of this "subversion," even
Professor Caron recognizes the primacy of the revenue concern, at least when
the taxpayer has not been a party in a lower state court decision subsequently
8
offered as binding precedent in the federal tax proceeding.1
9 Following up

181. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Likewise, the federal courts are
bound by the law declared by the state legislature. Id.
182.

Id.

183.

Cornm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1967).

184.

Id. at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted).

185

Id.

186. Id. at 465 (alterations in original) (quoting King v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 16o-61 (1948)).
187

Id.

188.
Paul L. Caron, The Federal Courts of Appeals' Use of State Court Decisions in Tax Cases: "Proper
Regard" Means "No Regard, "46 OKLA. L. REV. 443, 486 (1993)189.

Id. at 4 86-8

7.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

2150

[VOI. 103:2119

on Professor Caron's study, I have examined decisions since 1992 reported
by Westlaw and have found that lower federal courts are still following one of
the three approaches to "proper regard" that were identified by Professor
Caron. Thus, regardless of the precise meaning given to "proper regard" by
federal courts in tax matters, it is clearly not the "strict" regard that the First
Circuit in Charaniaconcluded was necessary. 19°
Moreover, Bosch involved state trial and probate court decisions. At stake
was the proper respect the federal system must show lower state courts when
federal courts are required to reference state substantive law in order to
determine federal tax consequences. In Charania, the First Circuit seemed
entirely unaware that the federalism concerns at stake in Bosch, as well as Erie
and Klaxon, are not at stake when the law of a foreign country, which is not
part of the federal system, is being referenced. There is no reason for the same
degree of solicitude to be shown. In light of this, the Charania court's
obeisance to the 1900 House of Lords decision in De Nicols v. Curliermakes
little sense. 191
Indeed, the First Circuit concluded that it should put itself in the position
of a Belgian court.1 92 For such a court, U.S. federalism concerns and the
emanations of Eriewould not be pertinent. Moreover, under the Belgian legal
system, as with most civil-law legal systems, precedent does not carry the same
weight as under a common-law system.93 Often, scholarly authority is more
significant than lower court decisions. 194 With time, prior decisions may be
deemed to have become antiquated and not deserving of continuing
respect. 195
Even assuming that U.S. federalism concerns do apply, and on those
grounds, respect must be shown by a U.S. federal court deciding U.S. federal
tax matters, to the law of Belgium, and its conflict-of-laws rules, there is simply
no way to know how the highest court of Belgium would construe De Nicols v.
Curlier-a conflicts-of-law decision by the United Kingdom's House of Lords
from more than a century ago. The rationale of the decision, as well as the

19o.

Estate of Charania v. Shulnan, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2oo).

191.
De Nicols v. Curlier [ 19oo] A.C. 21 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). With regard to the
sharply differing considerations when U.S. domestic versus international conflict of laws is
involved, see Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundationsof Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 259 (1992) ("It is a serious mistake to discuss
domestic and international choice-of-law cases interchangeably, even though that practice is
nearly universal in the conflicts literature.").
192.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 71.

193.

See Mark Van Hoecke, Legal Culture and Legal Transplants, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND
SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 273, 278-80 (Richard
Nobles & David Schiff eds., 2014); Belgium, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE, https://e-justice.europa.
eu/content member statelaw-6-be-en.do?member- i (last updatedJuly 18, 2017).
COMMUNITY:

194.

Van Hoecke, supra note 193, at 279-8o.

195.

Seeid. at 279.
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opinion's continuing authority, have been strenuously debated by
6
commentators in England and elsewhere for more than a hundred years.19
In any event, the fact that De Nicols was decided by the highest court of
the United Kingdom at the time, hardly demands slavish adherence to it even
if the federal courts were required to show the same deference to foreign high
courts as to state high courts under Bosch. Significantly, one of the litigants in
Charania, the IRS, had already taken a position in several administrative
rulings opting for an extremely narrow reading. Indeed, the IRS has
maintained that it is not necessarily bound to adhere to the decisions of the
highest court of a U.S. state. The Service has reasoned that Bosch:
did not say that the decision of the highest court of state is always
binding; seemingly in a federal tax case, such decisions remain
vulnerable to the charge that they emerged from a non-adversary
proceeding.... A second reason for giving no weight.., is found in
Lanigan v. Commissioner,45 T.C. 247 (1965) .... The tax court in a
well-reasoned opinion based on substantial authority, held that the
practice of following a state court adjudication of a property interest
does not apply when the decree has no effect under state law as a
determination of such an interest. 197
This same reasoning has been echoed in other administrative
determinations, including Revenue Ruling 69-285, in which the Service stated
that "[a] state court decree is considered to be conclusive in the
determination of the Federal tax liability of an estate only to the extent that it
determines property rights, and if the issuing court is the highest court in the state." 198
The requirement that property rights must have been adjudicated is based on
language in Bosch wherein the Supreme Court states that the question before
it is the effect of "a state trial court adjudication of property rights or
characterization of property interests." 199 The emphasis on what was decided
by a state high court was explained further in General Counsel Memorandum
39,183,200 which detailed the reason behind the Service's narrow reading of
Bosch. It stated that:
[S]ince there is no federal law of property ... the question of the
extent of the decedent's interest in property is a matter of state law.
If a state decision does not determine the extent of the decedent's

196.

See supra text acconpanying notes 133-45.

197.

I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mein. 83-39-004 (June 14, 1983) (emphasis in original).

198.

Rev. Rul. 69-285, 1969-1 C.B. 222 (emphasis added) (citing Comm'rv. Estate of Bosch,

387 U.S. 456 (1967)).
199.

Estate ofBosch, 387 U.S. at 456-57.
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I.R.S. Gen. Courts. Mem. 39,183 (Mar. 6, 1984).
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property interest, such decision is simply not relevant for federal
estate tax purposes.0 1
De Nicols, the principal case on which Charaniais grounded, did not
decide the extent of property rights. Rather, it decided the conflict-of-laws
question, that is, what law should determine the extent of property rights.22
There is a serious question whether the IRS's administrative authorities
should have been brought to the attention of the First Circuit, as they clearly
are in conflict with the view that a federal court is bound by the high court of
a "state." Again, this further assumes the word "state" includes the foreign
country of Belgium.
Apart from the tax administrative authorities cited, federal courts
jurisprudence makes clear that a federal court need not be a "ventriloquist's
dummy" in applying the law of a state, even if there is a state high court
decision.2°3 In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, the Supreme Court
required application of the decision of the Vermont Supreme Court precisely
because "there appears to be no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no
developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones,
no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont judges on the
question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the judicial
rule."14 In other words, "Bernhardtimplicitly recognized that federal courts
should be sensitive to possible changes in state law that they are required to
apply in deference to the Erie principle."205 When considered in light of
Bernhardtand subsequent authority following it, De Nicols appears as a perfect
candidate for reconsideration by federal courts, and not one requiring slavish
adherence, as per the First Circuit's conclusion that it was "bound to adhere
to the rule of De Nicols absent a compelling showing that the English courts
would scuttle that rule." 206
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article's primary objective in considering the Charaniadecision is to
expose the many analytical errors the First Circuit committed as it engaged in
the choice-of-law process. The sheer quantity and severity of the errors offer
striking evidence of the risk of a seriously flawed outcome that stems from a
court unnecessarily-and in opposition to existing precedent-engaging
incautiously in the conflict-of-laws process, especially when international

2o.
Id. at*7; see also hR.S.Gen. Courts. Mere. 33,934 (Sept. 27, 1968), withdrawn,I.R.S. Gen.
Couts. Mein. 35,073 (Oct. to, 1972).
202.

Estate of Charania v. Shulman, 6o8 F.3 d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2oo).

203.

19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 ( 3 d ed.),

Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017)
(2d Cir. 1942)).
204.

(quoting Richardson v. Coinn'r, 126 F.2d 562, 567

205.

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956).
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 203, § 4507.

2o6.

Estate of Charania,6o8 F. 3 d at 75.
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elements dominate. For those with cross-border wealth, Charania leaves
matters very much unsettled-it shows that normal expectations of spouses as
to ownership and tax liability may not be proven accurate and outcomes may
simply not be determinable in advance, a highly inefficient result.
Going forward, Charania'sflawed analysis must not be permitted to gain
precedential value. If that occurs, the longstanding, workable, and
predictable conflict-of-laws rules that have been almost uniformly applied to
date by courts in the United States with regard to conflict of laws involving
marital property would be jeopardized. Most notably, the impulse to sit as a
foreign court needs to be curbed, especially to the extent it entails application
of renvoi. The partial-mutability approach, coupled with a reference only to
the foreign domestic law, achieves this goal. Likewise, a uniform set of federal
choice-of-law principles, such as one based on the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, should be preferred in matters of property ownership,
especially affecting federal taxation. The acknowledgement of the
inapplicability of Erie, Klaxon, and Bosch is also critical so as to avoid slavish
adherence to often poorly understood foreign law in situations that do not
present the domestic concerns central to those decisions. On facts similar to
Charania, courts should favor the single remission to the well understood
domestic law of a country with a highly developed legal system, like Belgium.
It is much more likely to yield a fair and predictable result, and one that
constitutes a more accurate determination of foreign law, than serial
applications of the whole law of a variety ofjurisdictions.
In light of the complexities and pitfalls associated with U.S. courts
looking abroad for controlling law, a skeptical eye must be brought into play
whenever a departure from forum law and application of a foreign law is
urged. When reference is to be made to a foreign law at a national level and
no such law exists, as is true of the United Kingdom, the reference to the
foreign law is even less defensible.
Lastly-at least in the context of marital-property law-the venerable
doctrine of partial mutability, coupled with rejection of renvoi, does appear
to yield a result that comports with spousal expectations. Certainly, this is true
in the involuntary exile setting, as in Charania,where the shortcomings of
strict immutability are especially striking. Particularly, when the vital interests
of efficient and consistent tax assessment are at stake as well, as in Charania,
the case for the partial-mutability rule, without renvoi, is all the more
compelling.
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